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CHAPTER 7

The evaluative function of situation-bound utterances in intercultural interaction

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This chapter aims to examine the evaluative function of situation-bound utterances in intercultural interactions. The subject of inquiry is a unique formula whose use is tied to certain reoccurring situations. Situation-bound utterances (SBU) are frequently used in any language because these expressions serve as interactional patterns and rituals that usually mean the same to all speakers of a particular speech community. In a way, SBUs are reflections of the way native speakers of a language think. But what happens if the users of SBUs belong to different speech communities having a variety of L1s other than English? Will SBUs still keep their evaluative function (if any) when used in intercultural communication? These questions are very important if we accept that evaluative functions of language are culture- and language-specific. In order to answer the questions the chapter sets out to discuss the role of context in which situation-bound utterances are used.

1. Introduction

This chapter has two main goals. First, it demonstrates how the evaluative function of language works with situation-bound utterances in intercultural interaction. Second, it argues that context may affect linguistic evaluation in a different way in intercultural encounters than in intracultural communication. Evaluation will be understood in this chapter as "the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about" (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5).

The object of inquiry is a particular type of formulaic expressions called "situation-bound utterances" (Kecskes 2000, 2003, 2010). Situation-bound utterances (SBUs) are highly conventionalized, prefabricated pragmatic units whose occurrences are tied to standardized communicative situations (Coulmas 1981; Fónagy 2001; Kiefer 1985, 1995; Kecskes 2000; 2003). SBUs are frequently used in any language because these expressions serve as interactional patterns and rituals that usually mean the same to all speakers of a particular speech community. For instance:

(1) *English:*
You are all set.
I'll talk to you later.
Welcome aboard.

Russian:
Gde ty propadal? [Where have you been?]
Kak dela? [How is it going?]

Turkish:
Yolun acik olsun [May your way be open.]
Agzindan yel alsin [May the wind take it from your mouth.]

The reason why these expressions are the focus of this chapter is that they are culture-specific, and I will argue that, to some extent, evaluative functions of language are also culture- and language-specific. SBUs are reflections of the way native speakers of a language think. One of the best ways to prove that people having different first languages think differently is to analyze situation-bound utterances. Language learners often make the mistake that they think what is expressed in their language should also be expressed in the target language. "How do you say this in English?" is one of the most frequent questions of English language learners. I think it is appropriate to respond with another question: "Why do you think that this can or needs to be said in English?" In fact, the question that should be asked is not "how do you say *x* in English?", but rather whether there exists an English utterance *y* that is appropriate to the situation in which *x* is used in the other language. So the first step of inquiry is to figure out whether the target language may, can, or needs to express something similar to that which the speaker has in mind based on his/her own language.

2. Characteristics of Situation-Bound Utterances

It is important to clarify the relation of SBUs to "conversational routines" (cf. Coulmas 1981; Aijmer 1996) on the one hand, and to idioms on the other. Semantic idioms (e.g. *make both ends meet, kick the bucket*) do not have psychological reality. They are stored as unanalyzed chunks in memory just like words, and are retrieved as a whole. They are not tied to particular situations and can occur in any phase of a conversation where speakers find their use appropriate. Pragmatic idioms are different. They can be split into two groups: conversational routines and situation-bound utterances. The difference between them is sociocultural rather than linguistic.

Conversational routines (CR) have an inclusive relation to SBUs. CRs constitute a much broader category than SBUs. Conversational routines include speech formulas (*you know*, *I see, no problem*), discourse markers (see Fraser 1999) and SBUs. All SBUs are conversational routines, but this is not so conversely, because not all expressions labeled as conversational routines are SBUs. For instance, *you know*, *I see, no problem* can be considered conversational routines but they are not SBUs. Aijmer argued that conversational routines are expressions which, as a result of recurrence, have become specialized or 'entrenched' for a discourse function that predominates over or replaces the literal referential meaning (Aijmer 1996: 11). It is not easy to draw the dividing line between conversational routines and SBUs but there are some features that distinguish them. Conversational routines are function-bound rather than situation-bound. They can express one and the same particular function in any situation while SBUs frequently receive their charge from the situation itself. For instance, *after all* or *to tell you the truth* are conversational routines rather than SBUs. They can be uttered in any situation where they sound appropriate. However, expressions such as *how do you do?* upon acquaintance, or *welcome aboard* as a greeting to a new employee make sense only in particular well-definable situations.

The tie of SBUs to a particular situation that charges their particular meaning may become so dominant that the functional-situational meaning may take over as the most salient meaning of the expression. For instance: *a piece of cake*, *help yourself, give me a hand.* Conversational routines tend to have discourse functions rather than a situation-bound function. For instance, *as a matter of fact, suffice it to say, to tell the truth*, and others. Discourse functions are not necessarily tied to particular situations. They can be expressed by conversational routines including not only SBUs but also expressions of turn-taking, internal and external modifiers, discourse markers, connectors, and others.

SBUs differ from idioms in origin, purpose and use. The likelihood of occurrence of lexico-semantic idioms is usually unpredictable because it depends on the individual speaker, while the use of situation-bound utterances is generally tied to particular social contexts in which their use is expected by social conventions. Idioms just like metaphors arise from a creative act. They are used to represent complex content in a tangible way that can hardly be analyzed conceptually. Situation-bound utterances are repetitive expressions whose use saves mental energy. Idioms are like lexemes while SBUs are more like pragmatic markers. SBUs fulfill social needs. People know if they use these prefabricated expressions they are safe: nobody will misunderstand them because these phrases usually mean the same to most speakers of a speech community. However, there is a price for repetitiveness. SBUs often lose their compositional meaning and become pure functional units denoting greetings, addressing, opening, etc. This is where we can draw the dividing line between semantic idioms (*spill the beans*, *kick the bucket*, *pull one's leg*, etc.) and SBUs (*see you later*, *it's been a pleasure meeting you*, *say hello to*, etc.). While semantic idioms are not transparent at all, pragmatic idioms (SBUs) remain transparent and usually have a freely generated counterpart (for instance: *get out of here* may be used as an SBU to indicate that the speaker does not believe what the other person has just said, or as a freely generated order to someone to leave). In contrast to idioms, SBUs do not mean anything different from the corresponding free sentences: they simply mean less. Their meaning is functional rather than compositional.

The loss of compositionality is a matter of degree. When SBUs are frequently used in a particular meaning they will encode that meaning, and develop a particular pragmatic function. This pragmatic property is becoming conventionalized when it starts to mean the same thing for most native speakers. That is to say, when native speakers are asked what comes into their mind first when they hear a given expression, and their response is very similar, we can say that the SBU has already encoded a specific pragmatic property. SBUs are both selective and completive. They are selective because they are preferred to be used to a number of other expressions, which can be both freely generated and idiomatic, and which equally could be used in the given situation. It is just the speaker's preference to use a situation-bound utterance rather than a freely generated expression. SBUs are completive because they evoke a particular situation, which freely generated utterances usually do not do. For instance, *let me tell you something* generally creates a negative expectation by the hearer, or *step out of the car, please* is something that most people identify with police stops. In freely generated utterances the sense of the utterance is defined by the interplay of linguistic meaning and context, situation, background knowledge. In SBUs, however, the communicative meaning, the sense of the utterances, is encoded, and fixed by pragmatic conventions. Consequently, prior context encapsulated in them can create actual situational context. For instance, *license and registration, please; can I help you?; you are all set*: all these expressions can create their own situation without being used in an actual situational context.

SBUs are usually transparent and have psychological reality. They are idiomatized in the sense that the words in them as a whole constitute a pragmatic unit with a particular function. Nattinger and DeCarrico (1992: 128) referred to them as "idioms with a pragmatic point". The weaker an SBU is motivated, the stronger it is idiomatized. According to the degree of motivation we can distinguish three types of SBUs: *plain, loaded and charged* (Kecskes 2003; 2010). *Plain SBUs* have a compositional structure and are semantically transparent. Their situational meaning may only differ slightly from their propositional meaning because their pragmatic extension is minimal, if any. Their meaning can be computed from their compositional structure. For instance:

(2) Assistant: *Can I help you*, Madame?
Customer: Thank you. *I'm just looking.*

In this conversation *Can I help you?* and *I'm just looking* function as plain SBUs while *thank you* is a speech formula.

At the other end of the continuum we find *loaded SBUs* that are the closest to semantic idioms because they may lose their compositionality and are usually not transparent semantically any more. Their pragmatic function is more important than their original literal meaning, which is difficult to recall if needed. These SBUs are "loaded" with their pragmatic function that remains there, and usually cannot be cancelled by the actual situational context because it is encoded in the expression as a whole. They are pragmatic idioms whose occurrence is strongly tied to conventional, frequently repeated situations. We think of a particular situation even if we hear the following expressions without their routine context: *howdy*; *help yourself*; *you are all set*, etc, because their most salient meaning is the one that is extended pragmatically.

Charged SBUs come in between plain and loaded SBUs. An SBU may exhibit pragmatic ambiguity, in the sense that its basic function is extended pragmatically to cover other referents or meanings (cf. Sweetser 1990: 1). For instance, this is the case with a phrase such as *See you soon*, which retains its original sense but can also be conventionally (situationally) interpreted as a closing, a way to say good-bye to one's partner. So this expression has two interpretations: a literal and a situation-bound one. However, the situation-bound function ("closing") is charged by the situation only. If the expression *See you soon* is given without a particular actual situational context it may be ambiguous because it can create one of two situations in the mind of a hearer: (1) closing, a way to say good-bye, and (2) what its compositional meaning says: the speaker will see the interlocutor soon. Here is another example with the expression "come on".

(3) Jenny: *Come on*, Jim, we will miss the train.
Jim: Relax, we have plenty of time.

(4) Jill: Bob, I think I can't go with you.
Bob: *Come on*, you promised to come with me.

In (3) *Come on* is transparent and functions like a speech formula while in (4) it is more like an SBU that serves to press the interlocutor to do something.

Situation-bound utterances encode the history of their use just like words (Kecskes 2003; 2010). However, there is a significant difference between the two types of lexical units. Words can collocate with many other words in creating meaningful utterances and their use is very rarely tied to particular situations only. SBUs, on the other hand, are usually tied to one or more particular situations. Coulmas (1981) argued that frequency of occurrence has a crucial impact on the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions. The more frequent they are, the more meaningless they may become in terms of referential semantics. This fact may have a profound effect on their evaluative functions. The compositional meaning of utterances often becomes of secondary importance and the functional aspect begins to dominate. Frequency and familiarity correlate in a unique way. Frequency can be general or attached to a particular register or situation. For instance, the utterance *Hello, how are you*? is very frequently used in everyday interaction. This is true because the situation (meeting and greeting others) requiring the use of this (or a similar) expression occurs very often. There seems to be a difference between word frequency and utterance frequency. Word frequency refers to the general use of words in any kind of situation. Utterance frequency, however, is more register-oriented and/or situation-bound. This is especially true if we take SBUs. It does not make much sense to speak about the general frequency of utterances when they are usually register-oriented and/or situation-bound. Consequently, the frequency of an SBU depends on the frequency of a given register or a situation the SBU is attached to. This fact has an important influence on the evaluative functions of SBUs.

3. Do SBUs have evaluative functions?

The simplest answer to this question is that some of them do but most of them do not. *Here is the thing*, for instance, is an SBU that signals an important point in the discussion. It has an important evaluative function because it refers to something that is significant in the given dialog. Politeness SBUs such as *may I come in; do you have a minute; are you all right?*, etc. certainly do have evaluative function. Tannen and Öztek (1981: 54) argued that "cultures that have set formulas that afford their members the tranquility of knowing that what they say will be interpreted by the addressee in the same way that it is intended". In other words, this means that when we use SBUs we want our partners to understand us exactly the way we mean something. But this exact way can also be an evaluative way. For instance:

(5) Bob: Hey, Rick, what's up?
Rick: Nothing much.

In this short interaction both speakers use an SBU: *what's up?; nothing much.* I do not think the utterance *what's up?* has any evaluative function. It is quite neutral in present-day English and is widely used by all generations. However, *nothing much* has an evaluative function, which is negative.

If we accept what Tannen and Öztek say, participants of intercultural communication seem to be in trouble. Why? If SBUs are interpreted by the addressees in the same way that they are intended by the speaker, then this means that SBUs have a strong common ground building power in the first language. This is possible because they are highly conventionalized lexical units that are tied to standard situations in the given culture. However, interlocutors in intercultural communication are sojourners rather than permanent residents in the target language culture, and occasional users of L2. Consequently, they do not have the chance to participate frequently enough in standardized situations that would lead to native-like use of SBUs. This means that the evaluative functions (if any) tied to SBUs may not lead to the same interpretation in intracultural and intercultural communication. For instance:

(6) A Korean student and the clerk are talking in the Office of Human Resources.
Lee: Could you sign this document for me, please?
Clerk: *Come again…*
Lee: Why should I come again? I am here now.

It is clear that the misunderstanding is caused by the two different interpretations of the expression *come again*. The clerk who is a native speaker of English wanted the student to repeat what she had said. *Come again* is often used in this function in intracultural communication. However, the non-native speaker student processed the expression literally because she may not have known the figurative meaning.

Non-native speakers do not have any problem in identifying the evaluative function of *plain SBUs*, expressions that are used in their literal sense. For instance, *you are all set, what can I do for you, have a nice day,* etc. However, they have serious problems with charged and loaded situation-bound utterances because they may be interpreted differently in intercultural interaction and intracultural interaction. Semantic transparency plays a very important role in intercultural communication. Some studies in English as Lingua Franca use (e.g. House 2002, 2003; Philip 2005; Kecskes 2007) found that ELF speakers rely on semantically more transparent language rather than formulaic and/or figurative language that may carry more native-likeness. Lingua franca speakers can hardly rely on common ground and mutual knowledge because speakers coming from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds do not share those. Instead they rely on the linguistic code with minimal inferencing. The linguistic code serves as their common ground. Non-native speakers avoid formulaic and figurative language (e.g. Kecskes 2007; House 2003) and mainly rely on the compositional meaning of semantically analyzable units. Charged and loaded situation-bound utterances are usually not semantically transparent. They have specific non-literal functional meaning. That is why their evaluative function may be lost, or the opposite may also happen, i.e. an evaluative function can emerge where it should not. One can, of course, say that context will make up for the lack of understanding non-literal meaning. However, this may not be the case. In order to see what role context-sensitivity plays in the evaluative function of SBUs we need to examine the role of context in intercultural communication.

4. Role of context in processing SBUs in intercultural encounters

4.1 Context and semantic analyzability

I argue that actual situation context may affect the processing of SBUs differently from what actually happens in intracultural communication. As a result, the evaluative function of the SBU may be lost or an evaluative function can emerge where it should not. Example (7) illustrates the first case:

(7) Three Australian travelers were drinking beer and coffee and eating in the café bar of Fuzhou Airport. The Chinese waitress went up to them and asked:
Ch: Can I get you some more coffee, sir?
A: *Who is stopping you*?
Ch: You want to stop me?
A: Oh no, just bring me the damned coffee.

The conversation shows that the Chinese waitress was not aware of how rude the Australian traveler was when he asked *Who is stopping you?* The waitress was likely to have processed the utterance literally but she seemed to be confused because it did not make sense in that context. So the actual situational context caused confusion rather than clarification because the rudeness of the expression was lost as the waitress could not process it properly.

Another case is when an evaluative function emerges where it should not. This is what is happening in Example (8) in which a Japanese student, Emiko, is talking to an American student, Melody.

(8) E: Melody, I have received the travel grant.
M: *Nooou, get out of here*!
E: You should not be rude. I did get it.
M: OK, I was not rude, just happy for you.

The processing problem is similar to Example (7) but the result is different. The Japanese student processed the SBU *get out of here* literally although it is clear that if processed that way the literal sense of the expression does not match the actual situational context.

This issue is very important because in intralingual communication the main tenet is that the context is everything. Almost all researchers seem to agree that no act is inherently polite or impolite, but such a condition depends on the context or speech situation. Culpeper (2009: 13) points out: "Impoliteness involves (a) an attitude comprised of negative evaluative beliefs about particular behaviors in particular social contexts, and (b) the activation of that attitude by those particular incontext-behaviors". This is true for intracultural communication. However, the issue of context-dependency should be revisited in intercultural interaction because context may play a more complex role than just being a selector/activator. This complexity can be understood better if we analyze the interplay of prior context and actual situational context in meaning construction and comprehension.

4.2 Context-dependency

In linguistics, context usually refers to any factor – linguistic, epistemic, physical, social – that affects the actual interpretation of signs and expressions. Context-dependency is one of the most powerful views in current linguistic and philosophical theory going back to Frege (1884), Wittgenstein (1921) and others. The Context Principle of Frege (1884) asserts that a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein (1921) basically formulated the same idea saying that an expression has meaning only in a proposition. Every variable can be conceived as a propositional variable. This external perspective on context holds that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of these features while leaving others in the background. Some versions of externalist contextualism take this line of thinking to the extreme and claim that meanings are specified entirely by their contexts, and that there is no semantic systematicity underlying them at all (e.g. Barsalou 1993, 1999; Evans 2006). According to this view, the mind works primarily by storing experiences and finding patterns in those experiences. These patterns shape how people engage with, and store in their minds, their subsequent experiences.

According to Sperber and Wilson's theory (1986), relevance is something that is not determined by context but constrained by it. A context-driven pragmatic process is generally top-down. It is usually not triggered by an expression in the sentence, but occurs for purely pragmatic reasons: that is, in order to make sense of what the speaker says. Such processes are also referred to as “free” pragmatic processes. They are considered free because they are not mandated by the linguistic expressions but respond to pragmatic considerations only. For example, the pragmatic process through which an expression is given a non-literal (e.g. a metaphorical or figurative) interpretation is context-driven because we interpret the expression non-literally in order to make sense of a given speech act, not because this is required by linguistic expressions.

The opposite view on context is the internalist perspective. This perspective considers lexical units as creators of context (e.g. Gee 1999; Violi 2000). Violi (2000: 117) claimed that our experience is developed through the regularity of recurrent and similar situations which we tend to identify with given contexts. The standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeated experience with, and about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. It is exactly these standard contexts that linguistic meanings tied to lexical units refer to. For instance:

(9) Step out of the car, please.
Let me tell you something.

These SBUs actually create their own contexts. Gumperz (1982: 138) says that utterances somehow carry with them their own context or project a context. Referring to Gumperz’s work, Levinson (2003) claims that the message versus context opposition is misleading because the message can carry with it or forecast the context. This refers to the double-sidedness of context as described in the socio-cognitive approach (Kecskes 2008; Kecskes and Zhang 2009).

The main problem with the externalist and internalist views of context is that they are both one-sided because they emphasize either the selective or the constitutive role of context. However, the dynamic nature of human speech communication requires that we recognize both regularity and variability in meaning construction and comprehension, and take into account both the selective and constitutive roles of context at the same time. World knowledge is available to human beings in two forms: (1) as tied to lexical items and images based on prior encounters and experience, and (2) as provided by the actual situational context framed by the given situation (Kecskes 2008; 2010). Context represents two sides of world knowledge: *prior context and actual situational context*, which are intertwined and inseparable. Actual situational context is viewed through prior context, and this combination creates, as it were, a third space. Meaning is, in this view, seen as the outcome of the interrelation and interaction of prior and current experience. This has a profound effect on the evaluative function of language because *prior, reoccurring context may cancel the selective role of actual situational context.* We can demonstrate this through an example taken from Culpeper (2009).

(10) Culpeper: Example 3: Creative deviation from the default context (cf. "mock impoliteness")
[Lawrence Dallaglio, former England Rugby captain, describing the very close family he grew up in]
As Francesca and John left the house, she came back to give Mum a kiss and they said goodbye in the way they often did. "Bye, you bitch," Francesca said. "Get out of here, go on, you bitch," replied Mum.
(*It's in the Blood: My life*, 2007)

Culpeper explained that the reason why the conversation between the mother and daughter does not hurt either of them is due to the context ("mock impoliteness"). However, a closer look at the example reveals that actual situational context plays hardly any role here. What we have here is the strong effect of prior context, prior experience that overrides actual situational context: "…they said goodbye in the way they often did." Reoccurring context, frequent use, may neutralize the impolite conceptual load attached to expressions. This is exactly what happens here.

For non-native speakers prior context may have a stronger effect on meaning construction and comprehension than actual situational context when processing evaluative functions of utterances. Interpretation generally depends on *what the utterance says* rather than on what it actually communicates. As a consequence, focusing on compositional meanings interlocutors may sometimes be unaware of evaluation because it is conveyed implicitly or through paralinguistic means.

4.3 Context and common ground

Prior context and actual situational context play a very important role in activating and building common ground. In a study Kecskes and Zhang (2009) made a difference between core common ground and emergent common ground. Core common ground is constituted by knowledge and beliefs that members of a speech community share based on their prior experience while emergent common ground is mutual knowledge that emerges in the process of communication, co-constructed by the participants. Core common ground is usually attached to prior experience, prior context while emergent common ground is immediately related to actual situational context. The following conversation (source Albany English Lingua Franca Dataset collected by PhD students) between a Brazilian girl and a Polish woman illustrates this point quite well.

(11) Brazilian: And what do you do?
Pole: I work at the university as a cleaner.
B: As a janitor?
P: No, not yet. Janitor is after the cleaner.
B: You want to be a janitor?
P: Of course.

In this conversation interlocutors represent two different languages and cultures (Brazilian and Polish), and use English as a lingua franca. This is the prior knowledge and experience that participants bring to the interaction. They create common ground, an interculture, which belongs to none of them but emerges in the course of conversation. Neither of them is sure what the right term is for the job the Polish woman has. They try to apply what their cultural models dictate but cannot be sure that the English words they have chosen describe what their culture "recommends". However, there are no misunderstandings in the interaction because each participant is careful to use semantically transparent language in order to be as clear as possible. The Polish woman sets up a "hierarchy" that is non-existing in the target language culture ("cleaner" versus "janitor"). However, this is an emergent element of the interculture the interlocutors have been constructing.

However, the lack of common ground does not always result in this kind of smooth interaction. This is especially true when evaluation is involved. Minimal common ground in intercultural interaction may affect the role that conventionalization, normativity, and formulaicity play in production and interpretation. Limited common ground may restrict the interpretation process to the compositional content of an utterance, and may also decrease context-sensitivity.

Core common ground is usually created through conventionalization and normativization. Target language normativity is usually limited in intercultural interactions in which the speakers have different socio-cultural backgrounds and co-construct common ground and meaning. Speakers who may not have an impolite intent are nevertheless assessed as being impolite, as they are perceived as being in breach of local or socio-cultural norms of appropriateness. This is exactly how the American girl (Sara) evaluates the Serbian girl's utterance (Mira) in Example (12).

(12) S: Mira, why don't you leave that letter on the table?
M: 'cause I want to read it.
S: It's not for you. Please don't touch it.
M: *Screw you, Sara.*
S: What did you just say?
M (laughing nervously): Nothing.

Non-native speakers in intercultural interaction may not feel the burden of impolite conceptual load of expressions, and use them freely, with no or low responsibility. This is what seems to have happened in this case. The Serbian girl did not really feel how rude the expression *screw you* can be. This is in line with research on cursing (e.g. Dewaele 2004; Jay and Janschewitz 2008) which talks about the fact that if a person utters a curse word or expression in a second language, it will have less meaningful intent than a curse in the L1. Or vice versa, if a person hears a curse in L2, it will have less emotional impact on him/her than a curse in the native language.

5. Conclusion

In intracultural communication SBUs rarely have an evaluative function except from politeness and impoliteness. They are supposed to be neutral and informative, and express the same function for speakers of the given speech community. However, in intercultural communication, especially charged and loaded SBUs may be interpreted differently because of the different contextual effects, the reliance on semantic transparency and the limited core common ground that the interlocutors share. As a result, the evaluative function of SBUs may be lost, or in some case an evaluative function can emerge where it should not.

It was argued that in order for us to understand the complexity of contextual effect we should take into account both the selective and constitutive role of context, and make a difference between prior context and actual situational context accordingly. Non-native speakers mainly rely on prior context, prior experience rather than actual situational context when processing SBUs. Consequently, the selective role of actual situational context in intercultural communication does not seem to dominate meaning construction and comprehension as it does in intracultural communication. Focusing on compositional meaning and not having the necessary common ground information, interlocutors may sometimes be unaware of the evaluative function of SBUs or see evaluation in cases where it is not meant by the interlocutor. Further research is needed to identify how evaluative language is used in intercultural interactions and what the major factors are that affect processing lexical units and utterances that are used in a non-literal sense.

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