

# Housing Inequality in Transitional Beijing

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## Abstract

*The market transition in China has resulted in significant social inequality, including housing inequality, in a formerly egalitarian society. This article provides both a conceptual framework and an empirical analysis of housing inequality in transitional urban China. Using the 1995 1% Population Survey and the 2000 Census data for Beijing, it shows that there was significant housing inequality between different socio-economic and institutional groups, and that the reforms in the late 1990s aggravated it. While emerging market mechanisms began to contribute to housing inequality, socialist institutions such as the household registration (hukou) system continued to be significant in the late 1990s, although there is evidence of the declining importance of other institutional factors such as political status. This study contributes to the market transition debate by arguing that different elements of the socialist institutions follow different paths in the reform and thus have different impacts on social inequality.*

## Introduction

There is increasing social inequality in former socialist countries that are experiencing market transition, and China is no exception (Szelenyi, 1987; Rona-Tas, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996; World Bank, 1997). Given the physical form it takes, housing inequality is one of the most significant and visible aspects of social inequality. Wealthy 'gated communities' with multi-million dollar villas and dilapidated 'migrant enclaves' with crowded shacks are now emerging side by side in Chinese cities (Huang, 2005). Despite significant housing inequality in Chinese cities, however, the existing literature on the impact of market transition has focused mainly on income inequality, and we know relatively little about housing inequality. There are two possible reasons: first, housing reform in Chinese cities was launched ten years later than economic reforms (1988) and significant changes did not happen until the late 1990s; second, there has been little systematic data on housing available to the public. While a few recent studies using survey data and aggregated census data have shed some light on housing inequality in China (Logan *et al.*, 1999; Wu F., 2002; Huang, 2005), much is still unknown due to the complexity and the changing nature of the housing system. This article aims to understand the patterns and dynamics of housing inequality in urban China by focusing on Beijing.

In socialist China, urban housing was considered a welfare benefit provided by employers (or 'work units') and local governments (through municipal housing bureaus). The allocation of public housing was based on a set of non-monetary factors, such as job rank, job seniority, marital status and household size, and public rental was the dominant tenure (Bian *et al.*, 1997; Wang and Murie, 2000; Huang and Clark, 2002). While there were evidences of housing inequality (Logan *et al.*, 1999), the overall level of housing

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consumption was very low (Huang, 2003a) and housing inequality was relatively small. Aiming to introduce market mechanisms into the housing system, urban housing reform was launched nationwide in 1988, and it has created fundamental changes in the provision and consumption of housing in Chinese cities (see Wang and Murie, 1999; Huang and Clark, 2002 for more details). First, former public housing is being privatized through subsidized sale. According to China's 2000 Census, about 30% of urban households purchased previously public housing, while only 16% still rented public housing. Secondly, new private housing — 'commodity housing' (*shang ping fang*) built by developers and 'self-built housing' (*zi jian fang*) erected by individual households have become important housing options since the mid-1990s. In 2000, 16% of urban households purchased commodity housing and 7% rented it, while 27% lived in self-built housing. Chinese urban households have been, for the first time in decades, given the freedom to choose their preferred dwellings, tenure and neighborhoods. Thus a social and spatial sorting of households and neighborhoods is taking place in Chinese cities (Huang, 2005; Huang and Deng, 2006; Li and Huang, 2006). A relatively homogeneous society is evolving into one with significant housing inequality and residential segregation. However, as markets begin to function well, socialist institutions continue to play significant roles in housing consumption (Li, 2000a; Huang and Clark 2002; Huang, 2003b). Thus, the dynamics of housing inequality in Chinese cities are rather complex and deserve scrutiny.


In the following sections, we will develop a conceptual framework to understand housing inequality in transitional Chinese cities and the relevant hypotheses. Then we will study housing inequality in Beijing using the 1995 China 1% Population Survey and the latest 2000 Census data. We end with conclusions and discussions.

## A conceptual framework and hypotheses

Housing inequality is one of the central topics in social sciences. In the United States, where private housing dominates the stock, housing inequality is prevalent, resulting from a set of factors ranging from socio-economic status to racial discrimination (Burgess, 1967; Clark, 1986; Galster, 1988; Massey and Denton, 1993). In welfare state nations such as the Scandinavian countries and Britain, a large share of public (social) housing is or was available, especially after the second world war, and housing inequality is less significant. Yet, with the withdrawal of the welfare state and the ongoing privatization process such as the 'Right to Buy' program in Britain, housing inequality is increasing and a 'residualization' process is taking place in the public sector as only the older and the less well-off population are left in social housing (Burrows, 1999; Forrest and Murie, 1999). Despite the dominance of public housing in socialist economies, housing inequality was prevalent, with those who possessed political power consuming larger and better housing (Szelenyi, 1978; 1983; Logan *et al.*, 1999). Yet it is problematic to apply theories based on studies in either market or socialist economies directly to housing consumption in Chinese cities where the socialist housing system is being transformed by market reforms. Nee's market transition hypothesis (1989; 1991; 1996) states that markets will gradually replace administrative fiat and political power as drivers of social mobility and inequality, and markets tend to reduce inequality. While this is supported by several studies on income inequality in China and Hungary (Szelenyi, 1978; Nee, 1989; Walder, 1995), scholars have observed that the power associated with political elites has persisted and inequality has increased during the market transition (Szelenyi, 1987; Bian and Logan, 1996). Rona-Tas (1994) offers a 'power conversion' thesis because he finds ex-communist cadres in urban Hungary are able to convert political power to economic benefits and maintain their advantages. In contrast, Bian and Logan (1996) argue that political privilege is deeply embedded in economic situations, and market coordination does not supplant bureaucratic

coordination but is grafted onto it — the ‘power persistence’ thesis. Yet this heated debate on the market transition hypothesis has focused mainly on income inequality. With the uniqueness of the housing system in China, we argue that the dynamics of housing inequality are closely related to, but different from, income inequality, and thus a different framework is needed.

Because of the transitional nature of the housing system, both socialist institutions and market mechanisms contribute to housing inequality in Chinese cities. While housing reform has not completely eliminated the roles of socialist institutions in housing consumption, it has generated new dimensions of housing inequality (see Figure 1). First, despite the reform, socialist institutions such as the Household Registration (*hukou*) System, work units and housing bureaus are still functioning in the housing system. The *hukou* system is one of the most important institutions in China in that it defines a person’s access to welfare benefits, including housing (Chan 1994; Cheng and Selden, 1994). It divides the urban population into four groups: local residents with non-agricultural *hukou* (local urban residents), local residents with agricultural *hukou* (suburban farmers), migrants with non-agricultural *hukou* registered elsewhere (urban migrants), and migrants with agricultural *hukou* registered elsewhere (rural migrants). Only residents with local non-agricultural *hukou* qualify for long-term subsidized public housing. In spite of ongoing reforms in the *hukou* system, migrants still face institutionalized discrimination in accessing public housing. They are also not allowed to access some commodity housing, especially that with subsidies such as ‘economical housing’ (*jingji shiyong fang*). Without housing subsidies, migrants often live in extremely poor housing to save on rent. While some are wealthy enough to purchase or rent private housing, most migrants live on construction sites, in trading markets, factory dorms or individual homes, particularly the homes of suburban farmers (Ma and Xiang, 1998; Solinger, 1999). Local residents with agricultural *hukou* do not qualify for public housing either, but they are allowed to build their own houses on collectively owned land. Thus, they may occupy relatively larger units than urban residents, but they usually live



**Figure 1** Housing inequality and residential segregation in transitional Chinese cities

in housing with poor facilities in a poor environment, as suburban villages are still constrained in developing their infrastructure due to the collective ownership of the land and the dualism in land reform (Deng and Huang, 2004). In order to sublease part of their dwellings for profit, suburban farmers themselves often live in crowded conditions (Zhang, 2001). Thus, despite years of housing reform, the *hukou* system continues to discriminate against those without local non-agricultural *hukou*, resulting in significant housing inequality. Residents with local non-agricultural *hukou* are more likely to access housing subsidies and live in and own larger and better housing than migrants and suburban farmers — *the hukou inequality hypothesis*.

Secondly, there is housing inequality among local urban residents because work units and housing bureaus continue to provide subsidized housing. Employees working in large and resourceful work units can access heavily subsidized housing from their own work units; and those with high political status are more likely to access better and larger dwellings (Bian *et al.*, 1997; Huang and Clark, 2002). In contrast, employees in small and non-state work units often have to rely on housing bureaus for accommodation, which is usually in the form of dilapidated and poorly facilitated bungalows in inner cities. Thus, the socialist housing allocation system has generated housing inequality between households with different political statuses and work unit affiliations (Logan *et al.*, 1999). Despite the central government's decision to end public housing provision in 1998 (State Council, 1998), work units continue to provide subsidized housing to their employees. In 2000, more than one third of housing completed was built by state-owned enterprises and government agencies for their employees (State Statistics Bureau, 2001). Thus, housing inequality based on individual political status and the nature of work units continues in the transitional era. Spatially, the contrast between work-unit compounds with multi-story buildings and inner-city neighborhoods with old bungalows persists as well. Furthermore, households who had access to subsidized public housing are allowed to purchase their dwellings at subsidized prices, and then sell them on the private market at a profit, which allows them to trade up on the housing hierarchy. Thus, the initial inequality in accessing public housing can lead to larger inequality in homeownership and wealth accumulation during the privatization process. As a result, after years of housing reform people with higher political status and people working in resourceful work units continue to enjoy housing subsidies, and they are more likely to own dwellings and consume larger and better dwellings — *the political status hypothesis*.

Thirdly, the recent housing reform has introduced new types of housing inequality. One main component of the housing reform is to promote homeownership through the sale of both public and private housing (Tolley, 1991). As a result, more than 70% of urban households were homeowners in 2000, compared to less than 20% in the 1980s (State Statistics Bureau, 2002; Huang, 2004). With the emergence of a new class of homeowners, stratification between owners and renters is in the making, which has profound socio-economic ramifications. Furthermore, with the massive construction of new housing and rising residential mobility, urban households are being sifted and sorted into different types of housing and neighborhoods, and inequality among homeowners and among renters is increasing as well. Compared to the uniform apartment buildings in work-unit compounds, new commodity housing in general offers better quality, but over a wide range from luxury villas to subsidized economical housing. Thus, local urban households with higher socio-economic status and who moved recently within the city tend to enjoy larger and better housing than those who did not (and most likely stayed in public housing), and they are more likely to own larger and better housing from the private sector — *the market hypothesis*. Thus, after years of housing reform, housing inequality similar to that in market economies has emerged in Chinese cities.

Finally, as housing reform deepens, local governments and work units are gradually withdrawing from housing provision. Consequently, institutional factors such as *hukou* and political status are likely to become less important in housing consumption. At the same time, with the existing public housing being privatized and the addition of massive

commodity housing, market mechanisms are becoming increasingly important in determining housing consumption and inequality. Socio-economic status is therefore gaining importance over time, while institutional factors are becoming less significant in housing consumption — *the transition hypothesis*.

## Empirical analysis

### Research design, data and methods

As the national capital, Beijing has a classic socialist housing system that is being transformed by a burgeoning private housing market. Because of the massive construction of public and private housing in the 1980s and 1990s, the overall level of housing consumption in Beijing has improved significantly, from less than 4 m<sup>2</sup> living space per capita in the 1950s to 11.64 m<sup>2</sup> in 2001 (Beijing Statistical Bureau, 2002). However, housing inequality has also increased significantly. Beijing attracts both the elite and poor migrants, with the former living in multimillion dollar houses and the latter in crowded shacks (Hu and Kaplan, 2001; Wu W., 2002; see also Figures 2 and 3). Thus, Beijing provides an ideal context to study housing inequality. Following the convention, this study focuses on four urban districts (Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu and Chongwen) and four nearby suburban districts (Chaoyang, Fengtai, Shijingshan, Haidian) in Beijing, as outer suburban districts and counties are predominately rural. Furthermore, suburban farmers with local agricultural *hukou* are subject to the rule of the rural housing system, which allows them to build their own houses on collectively owned land. Thus, they are excluded from the following empirical analyses that assess the impact of urban housing reform on housing inequality in Beijing.

Two datasets — the 1995 China 1% Population Survey and the 2000 Census — will be used. The 1995 1% survey is a national inter-census survey (with a multistage stratified sampling design) conducted by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB). While nationwide the sample size is 1%, the sample size for Beijing is 2.16% (Beijing Population Survey Office, 1996). It collected basic socio-demographic information for each member of selected households, such as age, sex, education, marital status, education, occupation, industry, employment status, *hukou* status, migration, and some



**Figure 2** Multi-million dollar villas in King's Garden (Jing Run Hua Yuan) in Beijing



**Figure 3** Bungalows and shacks in Zhejiang Village, the largest migrant enclave in Beijing

household information such as household type and household size. It also collected basic housing information, including the amount of floor space, number of rooms, presence of private kitchen, private bathroom and tap water, cooking fuels, building type and year of construction.

The 2000 Census is the *first* Chinese census to collect housing information. It includes questionnaires of short form and long form, with the latter administered to a randomly selected 10% of households (State Council Census Office, 2000). In addition to socio-demographic information similar to the 1995 survey, basic housing questions (number of rooms and the amount of floor space) were asked in the short form. In the long form, additional questions on housing were asked, such as housing type (self-built housing, purchased commodity housing, purchased economical housing, purchased public housing, rented public housing, rented private housing, others), building type (bungalows, multi-stories), cost (in price range), year of construction, building materials and facilities. We use a 1% random sample of the long-form dataset of the 2000 Census for Beijing (0.1% of total households).

In both datasets, households are grouped into ‘collective households’ (*jiti hu*) and ‘family households’ (*jiating hu*), and housing information is collected only for family households. Thus, analyses of floor space and facility focus on family households only, with the household as the unit of analysis. In order to encompass the increasingly large number of people living in collective housing (e.g. dormitories, quarter housing), collective households are included in analyses on housing tenure, considering collective living as one type of housing tenure. The heads of collective households are treated the same as heads of family households.<sup>1</sup>

Since significant housing changes did not take place until after 1994 when the State Council decided to deepen housing reform, the 1995 Survey can provide a useful baseline for housing consumption in the reform era, while the 2000 Census can reveal housing consumption after years of reform. Our access to these two datasets gives us a unique opportunity to study housing inequality as a result of housing reform. Yet these datasets have a number of limitations. First, the 1995 Survey did

1 We conducted another set of analyses including family households and all adults living in collective housing. Working on the assumption that each person in collective households made an independent decision as to their housing, each individual in a collective household is treated as a separate case. Results are listed in the appendix.

**Table 1** Housing consumption by household head's education, *hukou* and political status in Beijing (family households only)

	Floor Space (m <sup>2</sup> /person)	1995		2000		Floor Space (m <sup>2</sup> /person)	2000		
		FI=4 <sup>a</sup> (%)	Households N	%	FI=4 (%)		Households N	%	
<i>Hukou Status</i>									
Local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	19.9	66.6	35,478	90.8	22.9	67.4	1,884	67.8	
Local mover non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	22.3	74.0	1,988	5.1	27.5	77.9	503	18.1	
Non-local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	18.9	36.9	436	1.1	20.9	39.1	92	3.3	
Non-local agricultural <i>hukou</i>	10.3	5.4	1,153	3.0	10.0	4.3	299	10.8	
<i>Total</i>	19.7	64.8	39,055	100.0	22.3	61.6	2,778	100.0	
ANOVA ( <i>F value</i> )	168.3*	2,110.3*			73.5*	1,601.9*			
<i>Political Status</i>									
Officials	20.7	78.2	4,400	11.3	27.4	70.3	165	6.0	
Other occupations	19.6	60.6	34,655	88.7	21.9	61.1	2,606	94.0	
<i>Total</i>	19.7	63.6	39,055	100.0	22.2	61.6	2,771	100.0	
ANOVA ( <i>F value</i> )	161.7*	507.4*			16.8*	57.0*			
<i>Education</i>									
No schooling/literacy class	17.4	42.8	2,692	6.9	21.5	46.1	141	5.1	
Primary school	18.1	57.8	4,701	12.0	20.1	48.2	307	11.1	
Junior high school	17.8	57.6	10,325	26.4	18.2	46.7	870	31.3	
Senior high school	18.8	62.2	10,542	27.0	22.3	65.8	714	25.7	
College or above	23.7	82.0	10,795	27.6	28.1	83.4	745	26.8	
<i>Total</i>	19.7	64.6	39,055	100.0	22.3	61.6	2,777	100.0	
ANOVA ( <i>F value</i> )	245.5*	629.4*			37.4*	53.5*			

<sup>a</sup> FI (Facility Index) = 4 means that the apartment is equipped with private kitchen, private bathroom, tap water and gas for cooking

\* Significant at 0.01 level

not collect information on housing tenure and source, thus it is impossible to study this aspect and compare results with those in 2000. Secondly, neither dataset includes information on household or household head's income. In a mainly cash economy, household income in China is very hard to monitor and is often unreliable. Thus, income information was not collected, which limits our assessment of the significance of socio-economic status on housing consumption. Other more reliable variables such as education, occupation and number of employed persons will be used instead.

The following empirical analysis consists of a descriptive analysis of housing inequality and multivariate modeling to test our hypotheses. Housing consumption will be measured in three dimensions: (1) floor space (m<sup>2</sup>) per person; (2) facility index (a constructed index scaled 0-4 based on the presence of private bathroom, private kitchen, tap water and gas as cooking fuel); and (3) housing tenure. Because of limited housing information in the 1995 survey data, only the first two dimensions can be analyzed for 1995.

### Descriptive analysis

According to Table 1, it is clear that there is statistically significant housing inequality between people with different institutional and socio-economic statuses (see ANOVA

test). First of all, in both 1995 and 2000, the hierarchy in housing consumption was clear and consistent: residents with local non-agricultural *hukou* but who moved in the last five years (local urban movers, hereafter) consumed the largest and best housing, followed by residents with local non-agricultural *hukou* who did not move (local urban residents, hereafter), migrants with non-local non-agricultural *hukou* (urban migrants, hereafter), and then migrants with non-local agricultural *hukou* (rural migrants, hereafter) at the bottom. It is not surprising that local urban movers enjoyed the best housing as newer housing tends to be larger and better, and their share increased from 5.1% in 1995 to 18.1% in 2000. This shows that, with the deepening of the housing reform, a trade-up process is taking place and residential mobility is increasing. In comparison, rural migrants consumed less than half the floor space of local urban movers (10.3 v. 22.3 in 1995; 10.0 v. 27.5 in 2000), and few of them lived in dwellings with four basic facilities (5.4% in 1995 and 4.3% in 2000), while urban migrants fared only slightly better. Comparing 1995 with 2000, it is also clear that while local urban residents and local urban movers improved their housing conditions over time, migrants enjoyed negligible (urban migrants) or no improvement (rural migrants), which shows they benefited little from housing reforms in the late 1990s.

Secondly, officials with high political status are identified based on detailed occupation information — they include heads of government agencies, party and mass organizations, enterprises and public organizations, and party and administrative cadres. Table 1 shows that political status was important in both 1995 and 2000 as officials consumed larger and better housing than others. While both groups improved housing consumption over time, officials seem to enjoy more significant improvement.

Thirdly, it is obvious that people with the highest education (college or above) consumed the largest and the best housing. The pattern among people with other educational attainments was not very clear, and there seemed to be a curvilinear relationship in 2000 with people with junior high school education occupying the smallest dwellings. There are two possible reasons for this fuzziness: on the one hand, retired and older people with little education might consume larger dwellings as a result of the socialist housing system that favors seniority; on the other hand, many migrants have mid-level education such as junior high school, but they live in extremely crowded housing. The following regression analysis will show that education has a clear linear effect when other variables are being controlled.

Overall, about 48% of households owned their homes in 2000 when collective households are treated similarly to family households.<sup>2</sup> The majority of homeowners acquired their homeownership through purchasing public housing (37%), while self-built housing (7%), purchasing commodity housing (2%) and economical housing (2%) together accounted for less than a quarter of all owned homes (see Table 2). Renters mainly lived in public rental housing (33%) and only 7% lived in private housing and 9% in collective housing. It is clear that public housing still dominated both the owner and the rental sectors in 2000 despite years of housing reform. Yet the rate of homeownership and the source of their housing varied significantly across groups with different institutional and socio-economic statuses. First of all, *hukou* status continued to be an important factor in homeownership and housing access. Migrants were much less likely to be homeowners than local residents. About 8% of urban migrants and 4.5% of rural migrants were homeowners, compared to 58% of local urban residents and 52% of local urban movers. Migrants were also much less likely to own subsidized housing. Only

2 When individuals in collective households are considered as individual cases, the percentage of people living in collective housing is much higher, thus the rate of homeownership is lower — 36%. But the overall pattern is similar (see Appendix Table 2A). When collective households are not included, the rate of homeownership among family households (excluding local residents with agricultural *hukou*) is more than 51%.



**Table 2** Housing tenure by status of household head in 2000, Beijing (collective household head counted as head)

<i>Hukou Status</i>	Self-built %	Commodity Purchase %	Economical Purchase %	Public Purchase %	Public Rental %	Private Rental %	Collective %	Other %	Total %	Rate of Ownership %	Total HHs
Local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	9.7	1.4	1.3	45.8	36.9	0.6	2.8	1.4	100.0	58.2	1,936
Local mover non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	3.0	7.2	4.2	37.5	36.5	3.8	4.8	3.0	100.0	51.9	526
Non-local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	0.7	1.5	0.0	5.9	20.6	26.5	34.6	10.3	100.0	8.1	136
Non-local agricultural <i>hukou</i>	3.7	0.3	0.0	0.5	13.9	35.4	36.2	10.0	100.0	4.5	381
<i>Total</i>	7.3	2.3	1.6	36.7	33.2	6.8	8.9	3.2	100.0	47.9	2,979
<i>Political Status</i>											
Officials	5.1	6.9	1.7	40.0	28.0	5.7	6.3	6.3	100.0	53.7	175
Other occupations	7.4	2.0	1.6	36.6	33.4	6.9	9.0	3.0	100.0	47.7	2,795
<i>Total</i>	7.3	2.3	1.6	36.8	33.1	6.8	8.9	3.2	100.0	48.0	2,970
<i>Education</i>											
No schooling/literacy class	11.3	2.8	0.7	33.8	40.8	2.8	2.1	5.6	100.0	48.6	142
Primary school	7.9	1.3	0.9	33.2	38.3	8.5	5.4	4.4	100.0	43.4	316
Junior high school	11.5	1.8	1.5	26.2	32.0	11.5	11.2	4.3	100.0	41.0	929
Senior high school	6.9	2.1	1.9	35.5	37.5	6.0	8.2	1.9	100.0	46.4	770
College or above	2.1	3.3	1.8	51.8	27.1	2.3	9.4	2.2	100.0	59.0	820
<i>Total</i>	7.3	2.3	1.6	36.7	33.2	6.8	8.9	3.2	100.0	48.0	2,977

5.9% of urban migrants and 0.5% of rural migrants purchased public housing, and none of them were entitled to purchase subsidized economical housing. By contrast, about 46% of local urban residents and 38% of local urban movers purchased public housing, and 1.3 % of local urban residents and 4.2% of the local urban movers purchased economical housing. In the rental sector, migrants were also much less likely to rent subsidized public housing (21% of urban migrants and 14% of rural migrants compared to 37% of local residents and local movers), and were much more likely to rent private housing (35% of rural migrants and 27% of urban migrants) and, not surprisingly, to live in collective (about 35%) and other types of housing (10%). In other words, migrants were still discriminated against in the housing system in 2000 — they were much less likely to access subsidized housing in either the rental or owner sector, and had an extremely low rate of homeownership. Rural migrants suffered even more disadvantages in the housing system than urban migrants.

While the rate of homeownership was highest among local urban residents, local urban movers were more likely to purchase commodity housing (7.2% v. 1.4%) and economical housing (4.2% v. 1.3%), which tend to be newer, better in quality, and more expensive than purchased public housing and self-built housing. To some degree, this shows local urban movers are a selective group with higher purchasing power. At the same time, political status continued to be important. Officials were more likely to be homeowners (54% v. 48% for others), and they were more likely to purchase both public (40% v. 37%) and commodity housing (6.9% v. 2%). This demonstrates both their privileges in purchasing subsidized public housing and their ability to afford expensive private housing.

Secondly, housing tenure also varied significantly across socio-economic groups. People with college or above education had the highest rate of homeownership (59%), followed by people with no formal education (49%), people with high school education (46%), primary school (43%) and junior high school (41%). Again, without controlling for other variables, there seems to be a curvilinear relationship. While purchasing public housing was the dominant form of tenure for every group, it was highest among people educated to college level or above (52%). This shows that educated people were more likely to access housing subsidies in the quest for homeownership. Educated people were also more likely to purchase commodity housing, while people with lower education were more likely to own self-built housing. Like officials, educated people have benefited from the reform with both subsidies and improved economic power.

To measure housing inequality and its change over time, Theil's T statistic<sup>3</sup> is calculated (see Table 3). The plus sign in parenthesis indicates higher T statistics and thus higher inequality in 2000 than in 1995. The overall inequality was higher in 2000 than in 1995 in both per capita floor space and facilities. When the overall inequality was broken down into between-group inequality and within-group inequality, both were generally higher in 2000 than in 1995.<sup>4</sup> This shows that, despite profound reforms in the

3  $T = \sum_{i=1}^p \left( \frac{1}{P} \times \frac{y_i}{\mu} \times \ln \left( \frac{y_i}{\mu} \right) \right)$ , where P is the total number of households,  $y_i$  is the value of household i,

$\mu$  is the mean of  $y_i$ . T ranges between 0 and  $\ln(p)$ . Theil's T statistic is chosen over other measures such as Gini coefficient because it can work with group-level data, and it can be easily broken down into between-group inequality ( $T_{bg}$ ) and within-group inequality ( $T_{wg}$ ). When there is only group-level data,  $T_{bg}$  is used as the lower bound for Theil's T statistic for the population. They can be calculated

using the following formulas:  $T_{bg} = \sum_{j=1}^m \left( \frac{P_j}{P} \times \frac{\mu_j}{\mu} \times \ln \left( \frac{\mu_j}{\mu} \right) \right)$ ,  $T_{wg} = T - T_{bg}$ , where  $P_j$  is the number of

households in group j,  $\mu_j$  is the mean for group j.

4 The only exception is that inequality in per capita floor space between different occupational groups was lower in 2000 than 1995, indicating a smaller between-group inequality in 2000. The share of between-group inequality out of overall inequality was also lower in 2000 for occupation. This shows that the majority of inequality with respect to occupation lies in within-group inequality.

**Table 3** Housing inequality measured by Theil's T statistics

	Floor Space (m <sup>2</sup> /person)		Facility Index		Homeownership
	1995	2000	1995	2000	2000
<i>Overall T</i>	0.2164	0.2301 (+)	0.0385	0.1627 (+)	0.7197
<i>Between-group T</i>					
Education	0.0079	0.0126 (+)	0.0014	0.0056 (+)	0.1265
Occupation	0.0102	0.0040 (-)	0.0036	0.0167 (+)	0.0109
<i>Hukou</i>	0.0046	0.0156 (+)	0.0055	0.1127 (+)	0.0347
Political status	0.0002	0.0016 (+)	0.0003	0.0003	0.0004
<i>Within-group T</i>					
Education	0.2085	0.2175 (+)	0.0370	0.1571 (+)	0.5932
Occupation	0.2061	0.2261 (+)	0.0349	0.1460 (+)	0.7088
<i>Hukou</i>	0.2118	0.2145 (+)	0.0330	0.0500 (+)	0.6850
Political status	0.2162	0.2285 (+)	0.0382	0.1624 (+)	0.7193
<i>Share of between-group T (%)</i>					
Education	3.6	5.5	3.7	3.4	17.6
Occupation	4.7	1.8	9.4	10.3	1.5
<i>Hukou</i>	2.1	6.8	14.3	69.3	4.8
Political status	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.2	0.1

late 1990s, housing inequality in per capita floor space and facilities both *between* people with different socio-economic (as defined by education and occupation) and institutional statuses (defined by *hukou* and political status) and *among* people with similar socio-economic and institutional statuses actually increased over time.

Interestingly, most between-group inequalities accounted for only a small share of the overall inequality in both 1995 and 2000, and the majority of inequality existed *within* socio-economic and institutional groups. The contribution of between-group inequality was higher in 2000 than in 1995 with the exception of occupation for per capita space, and political status and education for facilities. This shows that in general between-group inequality was higher in 2000 in both absolute measures (between-group T) and relative contributions (percentage of between-group T).

Inequality between groups with different *hukou* statuses (between-group T) was generally the highest measured against education, occupation and political status, and the share of between-group inequality was also generally highest for *hukou* in both 1995 and 2000.<sup>5</sup> In 2000, about 6.8% of inequality in floor space was between people with different *hukou* statuses (compared to 5.5% for education, 1.8% for occupation and 0.7% for political status), and almost 70% of inequality in facilities was between groups with different *hukou* statuses (compared to 3.4% for education, 10.2% for occupation and 0.2% for political status). This demonstrates that inequality between people with different *hukou* statuses was more important than that between people with different education and occupations, and reforms in the late 1990s had aggravated the pattern. Inequality between people with different political statuses was smallest, and it changed very little over time. The share of between-group inequality for political status was also the smallest, and it even decreased over time for facilities. This indicates that political status was not very important in housing inequality and its importance seemed to decrease over time.

5 The only exception was the T statistic for per capita floor space in 1995.

Consistent with per capita floor space and facilities, inequality in homeownership occurred mainly within groups with the same socio-economic and institutional statuses, and the share of between-group inequality was relatively small. Education was the most important factor in creating between-group inequality (accounting for about 18% of the inequality occurring between groups), followed by *hukou* status (5%), while occupation and political status seemed to be much less significant. Unfortunately, because of the lack of housing tenure information in 1995, it is impossible to measure the change of inequality in homeownership over time.

### Multivariate modeling

To further test our hypotheses on housing inequality, two sets of multivariate regressions were conducted. The first set includes four OLS regressions on floor space (m<sup>2</sup>) and facility index using both the 1995 survey and the 2000 census data. The second set includes a multinomial logistic regression on housing tenure using the 2000 census data only because of the lack of housing tenure information in 1995.

The independent variables include socio-demographic and institutional indicators (see Table 4). The former include age of head of household, age<sup>2</sup>, education, occupation, and household variables such as household size, household structure, number of births last year and number of employed persons in the household. Due to the lack of household income information — and in full knowledge of the limitations of the system — the number of employed persons is used to indicate the household's socio-economic status, together with other variables. The latter include household head's *hukou* status and the number of officials in the household. Because the high political status of other household members such as parents and spouses can often lead to consumption of better housing, the number of officials in the household is used instead of a dummy variable indicating the head's political status. Because of the lack of information on work units in both datasets, it is impossible to directly test the effect of work units on housing consumption.

Table 5 summarizes the OLS regression results. All models are significant, and the models explain about 20–55% of the variability in dependent variables. It is clear that both socio-demographic and institutional variables are significant in all models, indicating that both socialist legacies and market dynamics affected housing consumption in the late 1990s. First of all, *hukou* status continued to be essential in housing consumption in both 1995 and 2000, demonstrating the persistence of the *hukou* system. Local urban movers consumed larger and better housing than local urban residents in both 1995 and 2000, while both rural and urban migrants consumed smaller housing and poorer facilities, with rural migrants coming at the bottom of the hierarchy. Thus, migrant status continued to have a significant negative impact on housing consumption in the late 1990s despite years of reform, and the combination of migrant status with agricultural *hukou* was even more devastating for housing consumption. This result strongly supports the *hukou* inequality hypothesis. In contrast, the number of officials in the household had a positive and significant effect in 1995 but not in 2000. This shows that the welfare-oriented housing allocation still prevailed and political status was still important in 1995, but no longer in 2000. This supports the political status hypothesis and the transition hypothesis.

Secondly, some socio-demographic variables have consistent, while others have different effects in 2000 compared to 1995, demonstrating the impact of housing reform. Older people consumed larger and better housing in both 1995 and 2000, yet the trend slowed down with aging. Education has a clear linear effect with better-educated people consuming larger and better housing in both 1995 and 2000. The seemingly curvilinear relationship between education and housing consumption observed in the descriptive analysis no longer exists when other variables are controlled in the models. In contrast to the consistent effect of age and education, the effects of the other socio-demographic variables seem to have changed over time. For example, in 1995, with the exception of

**Table 4** Descriptive statistics of variables in models

	Mean	1995 Standard Deviation	%	Mean	2000 Standard Deviation	%
<i>Institutional Variables</i>						
<i>Hukou Status</i>						
Local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>			90.8			63.7
Local mover non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>			5.1			17.4
Non-local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>			1.1			4.6
Non-local agricultural <i>hukou</i>			3.0			14.4
Number of officials in household	0.2	0.5		0.1	0.3	
<i>Socio-demographic Variables</i>						
Age	48.3	14.7		46.0	16.1	
Age <sup>2</sup>						
<i>Education</i>						
No school/literacy class			6.9			4.7
Primary school			12.0			10.7
Junior high school			26.4			32.0
Senior high school			27.0			25.6
College or above			27.6			27.0
<i>Occupation</i>						
Professional			17.1			12.9
Managerial			11.3			5.8
Clerical workers			7.1			9.7
Sales and services			10.5			15.6
Workers			20.2			17.1
Agricultural workers			0.5			0.7
Retired			27.1			27.5
Other			6.3			10.7
<i>Household Structure</i>						
Single person			8.5			21.3
Couple alone			11.3			16.9
Two generations			56.2			43.0
Three generations			16.8			13.6
Others			7.3			5.1
Household size	3.1	1.3		2.9	1.6	
Number of employed persons in HH	1.7	1.0		1.5	1.1	
Number of births last year	0.0	0.1		0.0	0.1	

**Table 5** OLS regressions on floor space and facility index (family household only)

Independent Variables	1995		2000	
	Floor Space	Facility Index	Floor Space	Facility Index
<i>Institutional</i>				
<i>Hukou Status (reference = Local non-agricultural hukou)</i>				
Local movers non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	3.217***	0.127***	2.907***	0.129***
Non-local non-agricultural <i>hukou</i>	-8.833***	-0.595***	-8.384***	-0.705***
Non-local agricultural <i>hukou</i>	-14.219***	-1.251***	-13.413***	-1.331***
Number of officials	4.515***	0.105***	0.224	-0.054
<i>Socio-demographic</i>				
Age	1.110***	0.045***	0.141	0.041***
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.007***	-3.5E-04***	-3.6E-04	-3.1E-04***
Education (reference junior high school)				
No school/literacy class	-14.881***	-0.411***	-3.027**	-0.169*
Primary school	-5.501***	-0.129***	-0.036	-0.148**
Senior high school	1.559***	0.076***	1.496**	0.230***
College or above	9.293***	0.269***	5.747***	0.271***
Occupation (reference = Industrial workers)				
Professional	3.619***	0.131***	1.086	0.138**
Managerial	1.223*	0.047*	4.384**	0.163
Clerical workers	3.498***	0.172***	1.354	0.119*
Sales and services	0.873*	-0.046**	-0.820	-0.104*
Agricultural workers	-4.834**	-0.918***	6.230**	-0.385**
Retired	9.983***	0.167***	2.732**	0.066
Other	11.198***	0.169***	2.034*	-0.408
Household size	0.049	-0.040***	-3.629***	-0.143***
Household Structure (reference = Two generations)				
Single person	2.061***	-0.172***	17.236***	-1.202***
Couple alone	-1.886***	-0.041**	3.365***	-0.257***
Three generations	5.011***	0.115***	-0.294	0.175***
Others	6.566***	0.068***	3.529***	0.130**
Number of employed persons	2.746***	0.049***	0.185	-0.080***
Number of births last year	-1.268	-0.102***	0.087	0.247*
Intercept	3.725*	2.079***	21.226***	2.7648***
Adjusted R-Square	0.197	0.226	0.373	0.549
Total N	39,055	39,054	2,803	3,074

agricultural workers,<sup>6</sup> people in every other occupation category and retired people consumed larger and better housing than industrial workers. However, in 2000, the result

6 Agricultural workers lived in smaller dwellings than industrial workers in 1995 but in larger dwellings in 2000, although they have always lived in housing with poorer facilities. However, the sample sizes for agricultural workers were very small.

was more mixed. While people in managerial positions and retired people continued to consume larger housing, professionals and clerical workers no longer consumed significantly larger housing than industrial workers, even though they continued to enjoy better facilities. A possible reason is that the massive housing construction in the late 1990s has significantly improved housing consumption for every occupational group, including industrial workers, thus the other groups (with the exception of managerial and retired people) no longer consumed larger housing units by comparison.

Furthermore, larger households lived in larger housing units in 1995 but smaller ones in 2000, indicating that household size was a criterion in housing access before 1995 but had ceased to be one in the late 1990s when public housing access was less prevalent. The same is true for three-generation households. Single-person households consumed larger housing than two-generation households in both 1995 and 2000, while couple-alone households occupied smaller units in 1995 but larger units in 2000. The effects of both household size and household structure show that the housing reform has improved the housing consumption of small and one-generation households who previously had to wait in a long queue for their housing but now can access their housing on the private market. While the number of employed persons is probably not the best indicator for a household's economic well-being, it has a positive effect on floor space. Consistent with other studies, the number of births is not significant for floor space in either year, indicating that the event of a birth still has not triggered residential moves and improvement in housing consumption in Chinese cities. Yet the coefficient is negative in 1995 and positive in 2000, indicating it is becoming similar to the conventional wisdom in the West. All these results support the market hypothesis and the transition hypothesis.

The results from the multinomial logistic regression are listed in Table 6. The dependent variable is housing tenure/source, with ownership of public housing as the reference category.<sup>7</sup> The model is significant, and the pseudo  $R^2$  is about 0.34. First of all, *hukou* status continued to be important for housing tenure and housing access in 2000. Migrants with either agricultural or non-agricultural *hukou* were more likely to live in collective and other types of housing, and to rent private and public housing (more so in the private than the public sector) than to purchase public housing. They were much less likely to purchase subsidized economical housing, and more likely to purchase commodity housing than public housing. This demonstrates that migrants are less likely to be homeowners and less likely to receive housing subsidies as either owners or renters, supporting the *hukou* inequality hypothesis. With the exception of self-built housing, local urban movers were more likely to be in every other form of housing tenure (i.e. to purchase commodity or economical housing, or to rent public or private housing) than they were to purchase public housing. This shows that they are more likely to either stay in the rental sector or purchase private housing — a result of high mobility and trading-up. This finding supports the market hypothesis. In contrast to the significant effect of *hukou*, political status was not significant.

Secondly, some socio-demographic variables are significant in affecting housing tenure. For example, older people were less likely to be renters in either the public or private sector, and to live in collective housing than to purchase public housing. In other words, they are more likely to be homeowners in both the public and private sector. People with senior high school and college or above education were less likely to live in self-built housing, purchase commodity housing and economical housing, and rent public or private housing than to purchase public housing. This shows that educated people are more likely to be homeowners and that they have received heavy subsidies in the quest for homeownership. Less educated people were more likely to live in self-built housing, purchase commodity housing or rent public housing than to purchase public housing. The effects of other socio-demographic variables are less significant or clear. For example, compared to industrial workers, professionals are less likely to rent public housing, while clerical workers are less likely to purchase commodity housing than

7 Heads of collective households are treated similarly to heads of family households.

**Table 6** Multinomial logistic regression on housing tenure, 2000, Beijing (family households and collective households)<sup>a</sup>

Independent Variables	Self-built	Commodity Purchase	Economical Purchase	Public Rental	Private Rental	Collective	Other
<i>Institutional</i>							
<i>Hukou Status (reference = Local non-agricultural hukou)</i>							
Local movers with non-agricultural hukou	-0.876***	1.038***	1.113***	0.249**	2.016***	0.233	0.959**
Non-local non-agricultural hukou	-0.106	1.907***	-39.557***	1.219***	5.225***	2.849***	3.372***
Non-local agricultural hukou	0.975	0.995	-40.202***	2.431***	6.865***	4.725***	4.941***
Number of officials in the household	-0.214	0.365	-1.258	0.216	-0.546	25.910***	0.065
<i>Socio-demographic</i>							
Age	-0.035	0.014	0.020	-0.107***	-0.136**	-0.550**	-0.184***
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.001***	0.001	0.006**	0.001***
<i>Education (reference = Junior high school)</i>							
No school/literacy class	1.061**	1.639**	-0.220	0.416*	0.138	-23.223	1.366**
Primary school	0.748***	0.049	-0.017	0.317*	0.171	-17.566	0.447
Senior high school	-1.116***	-0.311	-0.284	-0.325**	-0.561**	0.982	-0.989**
College or above	-2.337***	-0.366	-1.152**	-0.941***	-1.413***	0.558	-0.994**
<i>Occupation (reference = Industrial workers)</i>							
Professional	-0.334	-0.542	-0.245	-0.312*	-0.389	0.367	-1.008
Managerial	0.070	-0.167	0.545	-0.500	0.284	-25.201	0.517
Clerical workers	-0.331	-0.752*	0.276	-0.093	0.026	0.346	0.370
Sales and services	0.044	-0.381	-0.955	0.032	0.485	-16.781	0.294
Agricultural workers	39.396***	-19.584	-18.422	36.429***	35.205***	20.165	37.065
Retired	-0.480	-0.464	0.408	-0.110	0.076	-26.097	-0.531
Other	0.645**	0.031	0.933*	0.235	0.447	16.411	-0.449
Household size	0.098	-0.328	-0.268	-0.252***	-0.010	39.113	0.082
<i>Household Structure (reference = Two generations)</i>							
Single person	0.799**	-1.109*	-1.212	-0.025	0.461		0.644
Couple alone	-0.092	0.156	0.303	-0.401**	-0.098		0.043
Three generations	-0.290	0.663	0.997**	0.413**	-0.108		-0.115
Others	-0.270	-0.164	0.261	0.355	-0.175		0.339
Number of employed persons	-0.024	-0.085	0.123	-0.081	-0.077		-0.275
Number of birth last year	-0.593	0.012	0.205	-0.054	-0.469		-1.160
Intercept	1.309	-0.048	-1.417	4.342***	1.093	-266.810	2.462**
Log likelihood	-3,268						
Pseudo R2	0.342						
Total N	3,012						

<sup>a</sup>The reference category is 'purchase public housing'  
 \* significant at 0.1 level; \*\* significant at 0.05 level; \*\*\* significant at 0.001 level

public housing. Larger households were also more likely to own public housing than to rent public housing. Single-person households were less likely to purchase commodity housing than public housing, while couple-alone households were more likely to own public housing than to rent public housing. These results indicate that larger households



and couple-alone households seem to benefit more from the privatization of public housing.

## Conclusions and discussion

With the ongoing housing reform, Chinese urban households have enjoyed unprecedented housing options and significant housing improvement. Yet housing inequality is increasing rapidly despite decades of relative housing homogeneity in the socialist era. In this article, we have provided a conceptual framework for understanding housing inequality in transitional Chinese cities which features a dual mechanism of inequality in the emerging housing markets and persisting socialist institutions. Four related hypotheses are developed regarding the effect of institutional (*hukou* and political status) and socio-economic factors on housing inequality and their changes over time, which are then tested empirically with a case study of Beijing.

Using the 1995 China 1% Population Survey and the 2000 Census sample of the long form data for Beijing, we analyzed the patterns and dynamics of housing inequality in Beijing focusing on floor space, facilities and housing tenure/source. It is clear that there was significant housing inequality between people with different socio-economic and institutional statuses in 1995, with better-educated people, officials and those with local non-agricultural *hukou* (especially those who moved recently) at the top of the housing hierarchy, consuming larger and better housing. It should be noted that although housing reform was launched in 1988, profound reforms did not take place until several years later when the State Council (1994) decided to deepen housing reform. The reform in the late 1990s has significantly improved housing consumption for almost all social groups except migrants, especially those with agricultural *hukou*. Yet, the reform has also aggravated housing inequality. Both inequality *between* different socio-economic (defined by education and occupation) and institutional groups (defined by *hukou* and political status) and inequality *within* groups with similar status have increased over time, although in general the latter accounted for a larger share of overall inequality. Furthermore, there was significant inequality in homeownership and housing subsidies in 2000. Migrants, especially those with agricultural *hukou*, were much less likely to be homeowners and to receive housing subsidies, while officials and better-educated people were more likely to be homeowners and to receive housing subsidies. Yet again, inequality within groups with similar status seems to be more important than inequality between groups with different status.

All four hypotheses are supported by the multivariate analyses. Both socio-economic and institutional indicators were important to all three dimensions of housing consumption in 1995 and 2000, suggesting a dual mechanism of housing inequality in Beijing. Despite years of reform, the *hukou* system continues to be essential in housing access, and housing discrimination against migrants, especially those with agricultural *hukou*, continues. Subsidized housing in both the rental and ownership sectors was still exclusively for residents with local non-agricultural *hukou*, who in turn were the most likely to be homeowners and occupy large and better housing. Despite significant general housing improvement in the late 1990s, rural migrants enjoyed little improvement, and they mostly lived in unsubsidized and marginalized housing such as living in housing designated as collective or 'other', and renting private housing. These findings support the *hukou* inequality hypothesis. Other elements of the socialist housing allocation system also persisted in the late 1990s. For example, older people, better-educated people and professionals enjoyed larger and better housing, and they were also more likely to own housing that had previously been public. This shows that those who benefited in the socialist housing system continued to receive heavy subsidies during the privatization of public housing. At the same time, there is evidence of the declining importance of some socialist institutional

factors. For example, political status was very important in the socialist housing system for housing access and housing consumption (see e.g. Logan *et al.*, 1999; Huang and Clark, 2002). In 1995 households with more officials still occupied larger and better dwellings, but this was no longer the case in 2000. Nor was political status significant for housing tenure or housing access in 2000. This clearly shows the declining importance of political status in housing consumption, supporting the political status hypothesis and the transition hypothesis.

In contrast to migrant status, residential mobility (making short-distance moves within the city boundary) proved to be advantageous in housing consumption and homeownership. Local residents who recently moved within the city enjoyed larger and better housing, and they were more likely to own private housing, suggesting mobility as a means of trading-up in the housing hierarchy in an emerging housing market. There is other piecemeal evidence supporting the market hypothesis. For example, small households were able to improve their housing consumption as a result of the reform because they could access housing from the market instead of waiting at the end of the queue as in the socialist era. The lifecycle event of birth was still not significant but there are signs indicating that it is becoming more important. Education was significant for housing consumption, indicating the importance of human capital endowment; yet educated people were also more likely to own and rent public housing in 2000, demonstrating the persistent policy of awarding housing subsidies to educated people. Thus, it is difficult to separate the effect of markets from that of the socialist housing system, probably as a result of the transition and the lack of a more direct economic indicator such as household income.

The debate on market transition (Nee, 1989; Rona-Tas, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996) focuses on whether socialist institutions are being replaced by market mechanisms as the driving force for social inequality. This analysis of housing inequality in Beijing suggests that different elements of the socialist dispensation have taken different paths during the transition, and thus had different impacts on inequality. While some elements such as political status are being replaced by market mechanisms, others such as the *hukou* system continue to function in ways not very different from the socialist era. It is true that now most private housing without subsidies is accessible to everyone — however, migrants are still excluded from accessing subsidized housing in both the rental and more so in the owner sector. And this reality is not going to change in the near future despite ongoing reform. Thus, instead of the wholesale argument for the replacement of the administrative fiat by markets (Nee, 1989) or for the persistence of political power (Bian and Logan, 1996), we argue that there are different processes for different elements of the socialist institutions, and thus a more nuanced analysis is needed.

One of the main goals of the housing reform is to improve housing consumption. While overall there was significant housing improvement in the late 1990s, migrants, especially those with rural *hukou*, benefited little from the housing reform. They continued to live in crowded housing with poor facilities and were unlikely to become homeowners. Furthermore, the housing reform seems to reward the privileged groups who have already benefited under the socialist housing system, such as older and educated people and professionals. They are not only more likely to access public rental housing, but also more likely to be homeowners with the help of heavy subsidies during the privatization. In contrast, the less privileged groups in the socialist era, such as migrants and less educated people, are much less likely to receive subsidies during the reform, and they are pushed into the unaffordable private housing market. Future reforms should aim to provide more help to these vulnerable groups.

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## Appendix

**Table 2A** Housing tenure by status of household head in 2000, Beijing (collective household member counted as head)

	Self-built %	Commodity Purchase %	Economical Purchase %	Public Purchase %	Public Rental %	Private Rental %	Collective %	Other %	Total %	Rate of Ownership %	Total HHs
<i>Hukou Status</i>											
Local non-agricultural hukou	8.8	1.3	1.2	41.5	33.5	0.6	11.9	1.3	100.0	52.8	2,135
Local mover non-agricultural hukou	2.6	6.3	3.6	32.5	31.6	3.3	17.5	2.6	100.0	45.0	607
Non-local non-agricultural hukou	0.4	0.8	0.0	3.1	10.9	14.0	65.5	5.4	100.0	4.3	258
Non-local agricultural hukou	1.5	0.1	0.0	0.2	5.6	14.2	74.4	4.0	100.0	1.8	950
<i>Total</i>	5.5	1.7	1.2	27.7	25.0	5.1	31.3	2.4	100.0	36.2	3,950
<i>Political Status</i>											
Officials	5.0	6.7	1.7	39.1	27.4	5.6	8.4	6.1	100.0	52.5	179
Other occupations	5.5	1.5	1.2	27.3	24.9	5.1	32.2	2.2	100.0	35.5	3,750
<i>Total</i>	5.5	1.7	1.2	27.8	25.0	5.2	31.1	2.4	100.0	36.3	3,929
<i>Education</i>											
No schooling/literacy class	10.8	2.7	0.7	32.4	39.2	2.7	6.1	5.4	100.0	46.6	148
Primary school	6.6	1.1	0.8	27.8	32.0	7.1	20.9	3.7	100.0	36.2	378
Junior high school	7.7	1.2	1.0	17.4	21.3	7.7	40.9	2.9	100.0	27.3	1,397
Senior high school	5.6	1.7	1.6	28.8	30.5	4.9	25.4	1.6	100.0	37.7	948
College or above	1.6	2.5	1.4	39.5	20.6	1.8	30.9	1.7	100.0	45.0	1,076
<i>Total</i>	5.5	1.7	1.2	27.7	25.0	5.1	31.3	2.4	100.0	36.2	3,947

## Résumé

*En Chine, le marché de transition s'est traduit par une inégalité sociale considérable, y compris en matière de logement, dans une société autrefois égalitaire. Cet article fournit un cadre conceptuel et une analyse empirique de l'inégalité du logement dans la Chine urbaine en transition. Exploitant les données de l'enquête sur 1% de la population nationale de 1995 et celles du recensement de 2000 pour Beijing, il montre qu'il existait une nette inégalité de logement entre différents groupes socio-économiques et institutionnels, laquelle a été aggravée par les réformes de la fin des années 1990. Tandis que les mécanismes d'un marché émergent se sont mis à alimenter l'inégalité de logement, des institutions socialistes telles que le système d'enregistrement des ménages (hukou) ont gardé leur prépondérance, même si on peut démontrer le recul d'autres facteurs institutionnels comme la position politique. Cette étude s'inscrit dans le débat sur le marché de transition en affirmant que différents éléments des institutions socialistes suivent des trajectoires différentes dans le cadre de la réforme, ayant donc des impacts différents sur l'inégalité sociale.*